Reimagining Irsa| Dawn Article 28-03-2024 | Translate into Urdu

THE Indus River System Authority is under siege. Irsa is the only federal institution in the country charged with regulating, monitoring, and distributing the Indus waters among the provinces. It is mandated to implement the 1991 Water Apportionment Accord. The accord has become outdated. It is a source of inter-provincial disputes and accentuates climate vulnerabilities. Irsa’s most urgent challenge is to reinvent itself, support the political process to update WAA, and align its regulatory mechanisms with increasing political, cropping, and climatic compulsions.

 From the high-altitude peaks of Gilgit-Baltistan to the Arabian Sea, the Indus river system defines our civilisation and unites our people, economy, and ecosystems. It is also marked by countless disagreements and flashpoints within each province, casting a shadow over Irsa’s work and making it ever more complex and intricate.

 Water has always been a deeply political issue, wrapped in technical jargon. But now it is also entangled with climate change as a source of new vulnerabilities and a direct threat to our economy, ecology, and physical environment. Irsa’s functioning has become hostage to the changing patterns of the monsoons that have increased water uncertainty and the variability of surface water flows in the Indus. Climate scientists have raised questions about long-term water availability for the provinces.

 The development of water resources is a federal subject. Water management, however, clearly remains a provincial issue, firmly embedded in provincial water and irrigation policies and practices, and growing rural, urban, industrial, and domestic consumption. Changes in sowing seasons and cropping pattens have become the foremost perplexing issue.

 Climate scientists have raised questions about long-term water availability for the provinces.

 As is the case with the Indus Waters Treaty with India, WAA is based only on absolute volumetric flows, assuming no significant variations in surface water flows over the years. The volumetric allocations proposed in the WAA are fictional in real life and have never been recorded since the WAA was adopted. In reality, rarely, if at all, have the water figures mentioned in the accord been matched with actual flows.

 It is 33 years since the WAA was signed, but Irsa has not succeeded in developing any mechanisms to manage water scarcity. It is hardly better prepared than it was in 2004-05 to manage water scarcity that has become an annual politicised phenomenon from April to mid-June, the pre-monsoon period when reservoirs are dead empty.

 The WAA and Irsa both need to adapt to changing political contexts. The allocations for Gilgit-Baltistan, the newly merged districts, and the proposed Seraiki province in southern Punjab still need to be worked out. In the early 1990s, when WAA and Irsa were introduced, awareness about climate change and environment did not exist. Hence, these are not even mentioned in the two documents. Ironically, there is no provision in either document for the need to research and gather scientific data for evidence-based policymaking. Not surprisingly, repeated attempts by the government to introduce telemetry have been thwarted by interest groups.

 There is no provision for water supply from the Indus to the fast-growing urban population, except Karachi (the share for the federal capital was added subsequently). More than 95 per cent of the Indus waters is allocated to agriculture that has one of the lowest yields in the world per unit of water. This lopsided focus on agriculture in the WAA has left more than half the population without access to clean drinking water. Both Irsa and WAA deal only with surface water, even if conjunctive use has long been recommended.

A tug-of-war within the political elite has raged for decades. In Sindh, for example, the upstream Sukkur Barrage and its command canals get the lion’s share, followed by Guddu Barrage and then Kotri Barrage riparians. In real life, it is perhaps not the manual that decides the flows for canals, but informal elite influence and practice. During shortages, the lower riparian and tail-enders get little or no water when they need it.

 In fact, Kotri Barrage gets water primarily for Karachi, as almost 85pc of its water is allocated to the Keenjhar Lake to ensure supplies for Karachi, the country’s largest metropolis. This allocation makes some canal command areas politically weak and Karachi’s water supply has been handed over to water interest groups.

 In the context of climate change, water is desperately needed downstream Kotri to protect the coastal belt from seawater intrusion. Lands in the three coastal districts of Thatta, Badin and Sajawal are steadily becoming saline, and barren. Just the way Pakistan needs environmental flows in the Ravi, Sutlej and Beas, there is also a need for Irsa to plan environmental flows downstream Kotri. Perennial flows in the delta are essential to protect territorial integrity from seawater intrusion.

 In terms of cropping patterns, irregular and untimely rains discourage the cultivation of main crops like wheat and cotton in favour of sugarcane, banana, and rice cropping. Sugarcane now extends from the deltaic districts to the Peshawar valley and bananas have moved upcountry up to at least Rahim Yar Khan. A combination of market dynamics, flooding patterns, and licences for sugar mills, and no water pricing, have encouraged large farmers to become sugar barons.

 Right bank canals in Sindh mostly support rice growing by larger farmers. From Sanghar onwards to Rahim Yar Khan and Multan, farmers are shifting to rice cultivation. This is in many ways an autonomous adaptation in response to changing rainfall patterns that cause heavy damage to the wheat and cotton crop. The traditional cotton belt needs water in May and June, which is available only in years when heatwaves occur in the upper reaches of the Kabul river basin. In many areas, traditional crop-sharing is being replaced by daily wages, further weakening poor farmers’ livelihood options and climate resilience.

 To conclude, Irsa has to align its regulatory mechanisms with emergent trends. It needs to annually submit its water accounting statements, based on scientific measurements, to parliament. The federal authorities need to take a long view in reimagining Irsa as a climate-smart national institution owned and managed by the provinces.